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TrANSlATiNg The SubJecT 
à la FRaNçaiSe
MichAel SyroTiNSki
Towards the end of the long and complex entry entitled ‘SuJeT’ in the
Vocabulaire européen des philosophies is a sub-section – ‘la subjectivité à la
française’ –  surveying the ways in which recent French theorists have attempted
to rethink the concept of subjectivity. David Macey, in translating this entry for a
special issue of Radical Philosophy, chose to keep the term à la française in the
original.1 indeed, there could hardly be a more perfect coincidence of form and
content, énonciation and énoncé. it does exactly what it says: it is ‘the way the
French do things’, and as such is one of those terms we like to keep in French
because, like savoir-vivre, or je ne sais quoi, or countless other banal examples,
there is no satisfactory equivalent.  one could say that the original contains, folded
within itself, the very quintessence of Frenchness, and to that extent foregrounds
its own untranslatability.  To expand this linguistically, it functions much in the
same way that proverbs, idioms, or other commonplace sayings do in another
language, for example, and are often those instances of ordinary language that are
so commonplace they almost pass unnoticed. but one might say this folding back
on itself is also, as we shall see, one of the essential characteristics of the other
term, subject (at least in the French tradition), that is, as the irreducible self-
reflexive foundation of, or possibility of, thought. What becomes clear in the entry
on ‘SuJeT’ is that the conceptual history of the subject, and its distinctive
reformulations within contemporary French philosophy, at least since Descartes,
is the history of its constituent translations, and of the tensions that emerge
between theories of subjectness (subjectité), subjectivity (subjectivité), and
subjection (sujétion). A crucial part, of course, of the story of the subject ‘in
French’ is the explicit claims it makes to a certain universalism since Descartes’
own French translation of cogito, which opens the way for our understanding of
the modern subject, and recent French and francophone attempts to rethink the
subject.  
in Ancient greek, where the story begins, there was no one term corresponding
to the three semantic fields covered by sujet in French (or subject in english). The
greek word hupokeimenon was originally, in Aristotelian philosophy, both a
physical subject (whether in the classical distinction between substance/essence
and accident, or between matter and form) as well as the logical subject
(understood as the support of predicates, that which is predicable, and this is
equally true of logical and well as grammatical propositions (subject and
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1. ‘Subject’, Radical Philosophy 138 (July/August 2006), p. 32.
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predication).  Hupokeimenon thus conveys both material subjectness, and logical
subjectness. Philosophically, the question of the essence of truth is one of
subjectness, or subjectité, understood as a kind of unchanging support, basis,
foundation, or suppositum (to which hupokeimenon is closely linked). The
determining moment in the emergence of modern philosophical, political, and
psychological concepts of the subject and subjectivity comes with the translation
of hypokeimenon into latin, as subjectum.  This translation from greek to latin is
a crucial moment, indeed the event, in heidegger’s rethinking of the Westen
metaphysical tradition.  According to his analysis in his 1942-43 Parmenides
lectures, the latinisation of greek thinking is the event in which ‘the essence of
truth originally assigns itself, and transmits itself, to beings’, and involves a
fundamental shift from one régime of signification to another. The weightiest
burden of proof in heidegger’s account falls on the translation of aletheia as
veritas (and its associated links to a whole range of other philosophical terms, such
as ratio, and adaequatio).2 central to heidgger’s analysis is that there is a
determining link between the latinisation of greek thinking, and imperium (‘The
realm of essence decisive for the development of the latin falsum is the one of the
imperium and of the ‘imperial’, Parmenides, p.40), and for him this event of
translation precedes and makes possible everything else, indeed shapes the new
order. This political, juridical ‘roman stamp’ [der Romische Prägung], as
heidegger calls it, is thus the overriding effect of this latinisation of greek,
opening the way for imperial expansion,  along with its political self-justification
in all its forms, from christianity onwards.3 So the imperium folded within
subjection in a sense accompanies the transformation of aletheia into veritas, of
hypokeimenon into subjectum, and for heidegger the founding historial, epochal
event is a forgetting of being, which ‘seals’ henceforth the question of truth as one
of correctness (as opposed to falseness), or adaequatio.  At the same time it marks
the West’s covering over of this event, or at least its event as an epistemological
rupture. There are then two related etymological strands, which become confused
and intertwined over time: that of subject as subjectivity (derived from subjectum
in latin, and which sets itself against the object and objectivity); and that of
subject implying an idea of subjugation or dependency (derived from subjectus or
subditus in latin: subjection, sujétion, or assujetissement). This latter strand opens
up an entire juridical and political lineage, starting with imperial and christian
rome, which will be carried over through to the French revolution, once the
question of the subject is transformed politically into the question of citizenship.
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2. Martin heidegger, Parmenides, translated by André Schuwer and richard rojcewicz
(bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university Press, 1992), p. 41.
3. The religious aspect is of course essential.  Derrida in Foi et Savoir will coin the term
‘mondialatinisation’ (translated as ‘globalatinisation’) to underline the inseparability of
christianity and Western imperial and epistemic dominance. See Foi et savoir (Paris: Seuil,
2000), p. 48.
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For heidegger, Descartes inaugurates the modern philosophical concept of the
subject (that is, the moment when the subject becomes an active, thinking subject,
insofar as it perceives itself as subject), and the cartesian je pense, donc je suis –
which heidegger rephrases as ‘i think myself thinking’, cogito me cogitare – is the
invention of the transcendental subject.  kant’s emphasis on Descartes, and ‘the
cartesian cogito’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, subsequently determines Western
philosophical thinking of the subject as a question of ‘self-constitution’. From this
point on the two genealogies of the subect (the logico-grammatical one, in which
ontology and transcendental metaphysics are rooted, and the juridical, political,
and theological one), that is subjectum and subjectus, are in effect pulled together
and become inseparable.  kant’s systematic rationalisation and psychologisation
thus prefigures not only the hegelian dialectics of self-consciousnesss, but also
most modern concepts of subjectivity, ego psychology, and all of their subsquent
transformations.  it also means that the question of the subject is marked by the
tension between theories of subjectivity (subjectum), and theories of subjection
(subjectus), through what the authors of the entry ‘SuJeT’ term a ‘jeu de mots
historial’, a pun, an unintentional linguistic confusion that is not so much
historical as historial, or epochal.  however one takes kant’s and then heidegger’s
assigning such an inaugural role to Descartes in the history of the modern subject
(and as the Vocabulaire says it is ‘contestable’), there is an unquestionably French
dimension to this history, which it will fully assume, particularly with rousseau,
who plays a key role, and who will become the point of departure for much of the
critical reflection on the subject in the twentieth century. georges bataille, for
example, defines the subject in terms of its sovereignty, or its ‘non-subjection’
(son non-assujetissement), and for him the confusion between the subject-as-
sovereign and the subject understood in terms of subjection is also a ‘jeu de mots
mal venu’ (an inappropriate or abnormal, almost illegitimate, and certainly
undesirable, play on words).  This very tension, however, has had a determining
effect on much French theory that has followed on from bataille, notably lacan
(for whom the subject is a decentred ‘subject of the signifier’, an effect of
linguistic or tropological processes), Althusser (for whom subject formation takes
place through ideological ‘interpellation’), Foucault (tracing the histories of
subjects produced through a whole range of regulatory and disciplinary regimes),
or lévi-Strauss (whose anti-cartesianism is described by V y Mudimbe as ‘the
philosophical basis and the founding motto of ethnology’5).  
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4. etienne balibar has a long section in ‘SuJeT’on the emergence of the citizen as a political
category, which reprises an earlier essay he wrote for the volume Who Comes after the
Subject, where he replies very simply that it is the republican citizen who comes after the
subject (‘citizen Subject’, in Who Comes after the Subject, edited by eduardo cadava,
Peter connor, Jean-luc Nancy (New york and london: routledge, 1991), pp. 33-57.
5. Mudimbe, Parables and Fables (Madison: university of Wisconsin Press, 1991), p. xv.
Where is
footnote
4?
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in this philosophical genealogy of the suject, it is clear that the place of
language and of translation is critical.  From heidegger’s locating the foundation
of the modern philosophical subject in the latinisation of greek thought, through
to its more recent theoretical rearticulations, there are two crucial moments of
translation, and mistranslation; the translation of hupokeimenon as subjectum is
seen as ‘forgetting of being’; and then kant imputes to Descartes a
substantialisation of the subject (le cogito, even though Descartes never in fact
named it le cogito).  The contemporary thinking of subjectivity as apperception (i
can only appear to myself as such….) and the transcendental philosophising of the
subject as something to be freed from nature (or from its subjection, to nature) will
become the question of the realm of human freedom, and ‘sujet est le mot qui
dénote désormais cette étonnante unité de contraires’ (Vocabulaire, p.1226).6 So
while the two originally unconnected terms, subjectus and subjectum, do not start
out as part of a connected history, they become intertwined, precisely by an effect
of language, a ‘jeu de mots’.  Sujet in French in effect becomes a kind of
‘homophonic antonym’, one of those words which means itself and its opposite at
the same time, and which so fascinated Freud (as well as Jean Paulhan, it should
be noted).  
Alain badiou in his entry on ‘FrANÇAiS’ gives us another, related, version of
cartesian inauguration, and for him it is very precisely an effect of translation, a
function of Descartes’s decision to rewrite cogito as je pense.  According to
badiou, Descartes’s act, rather than challenging the hegemonic superiority of
latin through a national-linguistic appropriation, or reclaiming, of the privilege of
writing and teaching philosophy (as was the case with greek Philosophy before
him, and as will be the case with the german metaphysical tradition after him), in
fact has nothing to do with language, but claims for itself a paradoxical
universalism: ‘le privilège accordé au français ne tient pas à un quelconque
caractère intrinsèque de la langue, mais à la possibilité d’une addresse universelle
et démocratique de la philosophie’(Vocabulaire, p.465). indeed, as badiou says,
referring to Jean Paulhan’s little-known but intriguing essay on etymology, ‘la
France a toujours moqué ce que Paulhan nommait «la preuve par l’étymologie»’
(p. 468). So this universalism is both a profoundly political act, as badiou sees it,
and a radical departure from the etymologising tradition which for him
characterises german philosophy, not only insofar as this rupture severs language
from any essential, natural relationship to national community, but also because it
brings about a radical shift to privileging the syntax of language, its form, over its
substance, its nouns or substantives (substantifs), and thus the very ground of the
32 MichAel SyroTiNSki
6. See also the entry on ‘Je/Moi/Soi’ in the Vocabulaire for a lengthy discussion of the
inherent capacity, but also limitations, relative to german metaphysical idealism, of the first
person pronoun in French, which cannot in and of itself convey the self-reflexivity and
symmetry of ich = ich, or of hegel’s ich/Wir, and the movement of Spirit in its process of
becoming absolute knowledge.
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subject as suppositum, and then subjectum, that heidegger traces modern
subjectivity back to: ‘en dépit des efforts importés les plus véhéments, rien n’a
jamais pu plier en France la philosophie à ce dur labeur allemand qui ouvre les
mots, les dérive de leur racines indo-européennes, leur enjoint de dire l’être et la
communauté’(p. 468). At most, according to badiou, ‘ce que nous offrons
d’universel à la philosophie est toujours sous forme de maximes un peu raides ou
de dérivations mal nuancées’ (p. 472). Descartes’s gesture is thus perhaps an
example, to put it into badiou’s own language and radical ontological philosophy,
of a singular event, but his interpretation of this act of translation is highly
problematic. French subjectivity after Descartes is irreversibly grounded within
the French language, but to the extent that it confers upon French philosophy, and
its claims to universalism, the special privilege of being indifferent to its own
language, this universalism only works by virtue of a kind of evacuation –
badiou’s own term is ‘évidement’ – of language, and of the complex genealogy of
translation to which it is bound. What i would like to suggest, contra badiou, is
that this claim to French universalism, founded on the sovereignty of the subject,
had a determining effect in ushering in the age of colonial and imperial expansion
(in the same manner that heidegger claims the latinisation of greek did), and that
this epochal act of translation itself lends a distinctive style or idiom to French
colonialism, what we might terms ‘subjection à la française’.  in other words, the
eurocentrism of its humanism is instituted at the moment when the subject affirms
itself as subject.7 To put it differently, French colonial imperialism does not
contradict or undermine its claims of universalism, but this universalism would
have everything to do with French, and the process whereby the question of
citizenship becomes tangled up with France’s encounter with other cultures and
languages.  The use of the French language and educational system as vehicles for
linguistic and ideological subjection, and the production of colonial subjects, was
crucial to the success of France’s ‘mission civilisatrice’, as has been abundantly
documented.  
Now Jean Paulhan, although a marginal name in this narrative, turns out in fact
to be rather a pivotal figure here. he is best known as the influential editor of the
Nouvelle revue française, and author of les Fleurs de Tarbes. What is less well
known is that as a young man he was sent to Madagascar as a teacher from 1908-
10 at the island’s newly established collège européen, but he quickly slipped out
of his own ‘subject position’ as coloniser, and he increasingly neglected his
official duties, much to the irritation of his colonial superiors.  he escaped from
the space and rhetoric of French colonialism, spending more and more time with
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7. gayatri Spivak will make a similar argument along these lines in a Critique of Postcolonial
Reason (cambridge and london: harvard university Press, 1999), referring to her text as a
‘counternarrative that will make visible the foreclosure of the subject whose lack of access
to the position of narrator is the condition of possibility of the consolidation of kant’s
position’ (p.9).
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his Malagasy friends, and gradually becoming fluent in Malagasy.  he was
fascinated in particular by Malagasy proverbs, and translated an anthology of
popular traditional poetry, known as hain-tenys, which contained many such
proverbs.  Paulhan’s thinking about language thus begins with the question of
translation, and his interest in proverbial expressions is the source of his more
fully developed thinking on language, clichés and commonplace expressions
(lieux communs, for which his shorthand term will later on be rhetoric), whose
strange power he was drawn to.  he narrates his increasingly more involved
colonial linguistic interaction in a short text, l’expérience du proverbe, in which
he describes his efforts not only to learn the language, but more importantly to
somehow tap into the mysterious influence of Malagasy proverbs (what we would
perhaps now term their performative force, as opposed to their constative
meaning). What Paulhan discovered was that all language can potentially become
proverbial, since what starts out as original expressiveness can quickly, or over
time, turn into consensually accepted forms, or ‘maximes raides’, as badiou
would say. in one sense, this is entirely consonant with badiou’s thesis that French
is a language in which syntax overrides the polysemantic richness, or the
etymological depth, of substantives in other languages, notably english and
german.  For Paulhan, proverbs are effective because the syntactical, mechanical
function of language seems to operate independantly of semantic depth or
subjective intention. he diverges radically from badiou, though, in seeing this as
a feature of all language, and not something whereby French can lay claim to a
kind of unique privilege (even if it is through a negative recognition of its
linguistic poverty relative to german or english).  Paulhan’s experience is very
much one of translation or untranslatability (more precisely, of the
untranslatability of word order, as opposed to the untranslatability of words)8, but
it is one which also dramatizes the possibility of universalism (transcending the
division of self and other, understood here as colonial subjectum and colonised
subjectus) as the impossibility of any language arrogating itself the privilege of
this transcendant status.9
badiou’s thesis locating the cartesian moment as the foundation of a
paradoxical universalism suggests at the same time a radical break with a certain
faith in etymologism, and as we saw, he makes reference in this regard to
Paulhan’s text alain, ou la preuve par l’étymologie,10 in which Paulhan questions
etymology’s claim to be able to recover, through an archeological process of
reconstruction, an original, authentic meaning beneath the sedimented layers of its
8. See the entry ‘orDre DeS MoTS’ in Vocabulaire, pp. 891-92.
9. This is perhaps one way one might interpret Derrida’s reflections on his relationship to the
French language in Monolinguisme de l’autre (Paris: galilée, 1996).
10. alain, ou la preuve par l’étymologie [1948-52] Œuvres complètes, vol. 3 (Paris : editions
cercle du livre précieux, 1966-70), pp. 261-303. 
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successive transformations and translations, an argument badiou extends to the
use of etymology as a paradigm for philosophical genealogy more generally.
Paulhan’s text takes as its main target the French philosopher of language Alain’s
belief that earlier languages must have expressed more closely an original
meaning, which must have therefore been motivated and not arbitrary.  Paulhan,
however, argues that etymology as the search for the origin, or the truth in
language (the etymon of/in etymology), often turns out to be about as reliable as a
play on words, or paronomasis (his word is calembour), which can never give us
access to truth, but merely to more and more language: ‘Au surplus, le nom même
nous l’apprend: étymologie, c’est etumos logos, le sens authentique.  Ainsi
l’étymologie fait sa propre réclame, et renvoie à l’étymologie.’ (alain, p. 265).
Thus etymology, like à la française, doubles back on itself, its ‘truth’ revealed as
a fiction of true meaning, and it begs the question of how we can ever distinguish
between true and false etymologies. it becomes for Paulhan an epistemological
aporia, and in a typically witty and light-hearted style, he offers a profusion of
examples in support of his claims:
…on voit très bien que l’étymologie ne peut servir qu’à nous tromper sur le sens des
mots.  Quand nous avons appris que le sou était une pièce d’or (soldus), le maréchal
un valet d’écurie (mariscalcus), le soldat un mercenaire (soldato), l’invité un homme
à qui l’on fait violence (invitus), quand on nous a bien montré que chrétien et crétin
sont un même mot, certes nous n’en savons pas davantage sur l’invité, le soldat, le
sou, le maréchal, le chrétien.  Nous en savons même beaucoup moins. (alain, p. 276) 
And ironically, false etymologies teach us more about the underlying meaning of
a word, it would appear, than so-called ‘true’ etymologies: 
le mot de miniature s’explique assez bien par mignard ou mignon (mais il vient de
minium).  Forcené, par force (mais il vient de forsener, hors de sens) […] Forain
semble tenir son sens de foire, avachir de vache, flotte de flot, hébété de bête.  Pas
du tout ! c’est de fors (dehors), weich (mou), flod (germanique : flotte), hebes
(émoussé). (ibid., p. 276)
The epistemological aporia we are confronted with is thus the following: how can
we know true from false etymology, when the terms which allow us to make such
a determination are themselves indissociable from this very history, and
philosophical genealogy? underlying this playfulness is thus a very serious
question. regardless of whether such etymologies are mistaken or not, they have
had actual historical effects, as we have seen, and indeed Paulhan explicitly
includes heidegger among the list of philosophers who look to etymology for
‘proof’ of their theories (‘la métaphysique de heidegger, entre autres, est tout
entière étymologisante’ (ibid., footnote 2, p. 267). it leaves us with a more radical
undecidability, in which it becomes impossible to tell whether a particular
etymological genealogy (say, that of the subject) is a historical fact, or simply a
04 Syrotinski  20/04/2010  10:12  Page 35
36 MichAel SyroTiNSki
series of linguistic puns, or accidents of language. Maurice blanchot, in the
section of l’Écriture du désastre in which he discusses heidegger’s etymologism,
explicitly refers to Paulhan’s text, and describes this historicisation of linguistic
accidents as ‘nécessité d’une provenance, continuité successive, logique
d’homogénéité, hasard se faisant destin…’11
What Paulhan does is thus to allegorise this problem as a linguistic drama, such
that we could read the history of the subject as a kind of allegory of translation,
which radically questions the natural relationship of language to subjectivity (and
is thus akin to benjamin’s famous statements about the impersonal nature of art
and language at the start of his famous essay ‘The Task of the Translator’).  by
extension it also questions the supposed natural relationship of language to any
philosophical nationalism, but reinscribes it as a question of translation, or more
precisely of untranslatability, the simultaneous possibility and impossibility of
linguistic community. Paulhan seems to be also suggesting that there are perhaps
different philosophies of translation that are coterminous with, and run in parallel
to, the shifting political stakes in the various transformations of the subject
through history, so one might imagine at times a more ‘democratic’ form of
translation, at other times a more ‘elitist’, philological one, and at times a more
repressive, totalitarian form.  At any rate, his critique of etymologism does not
lead him, like badiou, out of the French language to a philosophy of universal
‘truth’, but to a radical rethinking of the very politics of translation as such, and in
particular rethinking subjectivity in terms of the colonialist ideology of language,
all of which will become resonant questions of postcolonial theory. 
if we are to take seriously the postcolonial concern, as articulated by gayatri
Spivak for example, about the imperial underpinning of european philosophies of
the subject, and their complicity with various forms of colonised thinking that are
merely masquerading as universalism, are (formerly colonised) non-european
writers and thinkers any more able to ‘step outside’ of this history?  This is in part
the project to which the African philosopher, Valentin Mudimbe, has devoted
himself, namely the possibility of conceiving, and more importantly peforming, an
‘African cogito’.  As the title of his best-known work The invention of africa
suggests,  Mudimbe is concerned with deconstructing and reconstructing the
11. l’ecriture du désastre (Paris: gallimard, 1980), p. 51. Maurice blanchot explicitly alludes
to Paulhan’s text in the sections in l’ecriture du désastre in which he questions the privilege
accorded etymology in heidegger’s ‘return to the greeks’.  he talks about the suspect faith
placed in etymologism as an epistemological method: ‘le savoir d’érudition se distingue
beaucoup ou peu des étymologies dites populaires our littéraires – étymologies d’affinité et
non plus seulement de filiation : c’est un savoir statistiquement probable, non seulement
dépendant de recherches philologiques toujours à compléter, mais dépendant des tropes du
langage qui, à certaines époques, s’imposent explicitement…’ (p. 147).  For a more
extended discussion of blanchot’s text as it relates to Paulhan and Saussure, see kevin
Newmark’s ‘on Parole: blanchot, Saussure, Paulhan’, Yale French Studies 106, 2004, pp.
87-106
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‘archaeology’ of representations, or misrepresentations, of Africa and its culture,
going back to the Ancient greeks, but primarily in relation to the French and
belgian colonial missions in Africa, a process he describes explicitly as a
‘socialization of the cogito.’12 Mudimbe often cites Frantz Fanon, one of the most
radical and influential anti-colonial thinkers of subjectivity, as an important
influence on his own work, particularly his phrase ‘Je suis mon proprement
fondement’, although on a first reading his ‘return to the subject’ might appear
surprising, given his avowed debt in his theoretical enterprise to French ‘anti-
subjective’ thinkers such as Foucault and lévi-Strauss. but the African cogito
which he promotes enthusiastically at the end of The idea of africa13 involves in
its very affirmation both a disarticulation of Western discursive objectification,
and a claim to a new form of subjective agency.  So Mudimbe reaffirms African
subjectivity as a necessarily double gesture.The affirmation of subjectivity is
indissociable from the performative narrative act whereby it is inscribed, or
reinscribed, and Mudimbe himself continually draws attention to his own subject
position in his text, and the circumstantial, contingent nature of his writing.
The francophone cameroonian social theorist, Achille Mbembe, has also
persistently argued for the need to find a way out of the ‘bonds of subjection’
which have been the legacy of european colonialism in Africa.  his book On the
Postcolony describes the interlocking dynamics of economic interests, the violent
exercise of power, and structures of desire in contemporary Africa. one of the
major concepts of the book is that of commandement, which describes the
relations of power in much of postcolonial Africa.14 in the chapter ‘of
Commandement’ Mbembe traces the corruption and violence that is at the heart of
many African postcolonial regimes back to the ‘founding violence’ of the act of
imperial conquest, a violence that is in essence the exercise of an arbitrary force
that affirms its own right to supremacy, precisely by denying the rights of those it
conquers.  Postcolonial regimes have thus inherited the same unwritten laws of
impunity and violence, sustained through a representation of the native population
as less than human.  The forms of ‘citizenship’ which this produced in postcolonial
Africa were thus grotesquely distorted, since the ruling elites put in place
technologies of domination that denied individuals many of the basic rights of
citizens, and governments dominated by violence and coercion.  This domination
is economic in its multifarious corrupt and repressive forms, but Mbembe argues
that commandement works perhaps even more powerfully at both a sensual and an
imaginary level (so he stresses the need to bring the body back into the question
of the subject, so in that sense, like Mudimbe, goes back to Descartes, but in a way
that reconceptualises the mind/body dualism of cartesianism).
12. Mudimbe, The invention of africa (bloomington: indiana university Press, 1989), p. 190.
13. Mudimbe, The idea of africa (bloomington: indiana university Press, 1994).
14. Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (berekeley: university of california Press, 2001).
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of course, this is not in any way to deny that French philosophy has itself
wrestled for the last century or more with the question that is posed in the final
section of the entry ‘SuJeT’: ‘comment sortir la philosophie française de son
idiome?’ From within the tradition, this is to pose the very question that Jean-luc
Nancy posed ‘Qui vient après le sujet?’, and the many attempts since Nietzsche to
articulate what might precede classical (i.e. Western metaphysical) determinations
of the subject. This tradition will run through phenomenological forms of
transcendental idealism, such as Merleau-Ponty’s theorising of a primordial,
bodily intentionality that is prior to reflective thought; bataille’s ‘inner
experience’; levinas’s subjectivity as an originary ethical responsibility to the
other; Foucault’s histories of subjectivity as so many histories of discursive
regimes, and then latterly, of practices and procedures by which the ethical subject
is constituted; blanchot’s neutrality or impersonality; Nancy’s antifoundationalist
critiques of various philosophies of the subject, and in particular of
phenomenology; or Derrida’s positing of a series of neologisms that enable us to
think the pre- or post-subjective, such as différance, supplement, trace, signature,
spectrality, the subjectile, or auto-immunity.  The question remains, though: are
we still ‘inside’ French philosophy, that is, the heritage of its syntax and its idioms,
which are all ineluctably determined by the history of the subject à la française?
Jean Paulhan’s own attempt to think through the question of subjectivity
outside of the historical and metaphysical determinations of the subject took an
explicitly politicised form in the figure of ‘le premier venu’, most clearly
formulated in his short 1939 essay ‘la démocratie fait appel au premier venu’. The
idiom ‘le premier venu’ can mean ‘no-one in particular’, ‘anyone’, ‘any old
person’, ‘the first person to come along’, but has no immediately available
equivalent in english that carries all of these connotations. in editing a volume of
essays on Paulhan for an issue of Yale French Studies, i was faced with the
decision of having to choose between competing english versions in many of the
essays, which were translated by different translators. i had to admit to my failure,
or inability, to settle on one universally acceptable term.  This had less to do, i
would like to think, with my own incompetence as an editor and translator, than
with the elusive power of the term itself.  its resistance to translation, and the sheer
contingency of the solution to each singular use that is made of it, is in fact the
very point Paulhan is making when he uses it in his text.  The irrational, seemingly
undemocratic principle, he argues, is in fact a kind of irreducible necessity
underpinning the very existence and possibility of democracy.  he underlines this
point in his texts after the war when he stresses the fact that in his view language
(considered as a working model for the way any human community is bound
together, in much the same way as in his essay on proverbs) has to make room for
a kind of arbitrary, random force.  in this sense, all linguistic encounters with
others, and the other (which is really every time we speak, as speaking subjects),
are fundamental ethico-political engagements.  The competing translations of le
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premier venu were all ‘good translations’, all happened to work equally well, to
the extent that they all actively engaged with this irresistible resistance of
Paulhan’s language, and indeed this is perhaps what Derrida is trying to get at
when he says that translation takes place whenever there is untranslatability.15
coincidentally, but tellingly, Derrida happened across Paulhan’s term in one the
last texts he wrote, Voyous, while he was working through the concept of a
‘democracy to come’.  As he writes: 
l’expression «démocratie à venir» traduit certes ou appelle une critique politique
militante et sans fin. Arme de combat contre les ennemis de la démocratie, elle
proteste contre toute naïveté et tout abus politique, toute rhétorique qui présenterait
comme démocratie présente ou existante, comme démocratie de fait, ce qui reste
inadéquat à l’exigence démocratique, près ou loin, chez soi ou dans le monde,
partout où les discours sur les droits de l’homme et sur la démocratie restent
d’obscènes alibis quand ils s’accommodent de la misère effroyable de milliards de
mortels abandonnés à la malnutrition, à la maladie et à l’humiliation, massivement
privés non seulement d’eau et de pain mais d’égalité et de liberté, dépossédés des
droits de chacun, de quiconque (avant toute détermination métaphysique du
«quiconque» en sujet, personnne humaine, conscience, avant toute détermination
juridique en semblable, en compatriote, congénère, frère, prochain, coreligionnaire
ou concitoyen. Paulhan dit quelque part, je la transcris à ma manière, que penser la
démocratie, c’est penser «le premier venu» : quiconque, n’importe qui, à la limite
d’ailleurs perméable entre le «qui» et le «quoi», le vivant, le cadavre et le fantôme).
le premier venu, n’est-ce pas la meilleure façon de traduire «le premier à venir» ?16 
This felicitous chance encounter with Paulhan, and Derrida’s own experience of
translation which it occasioned, is indeed one extraordinarily precise and
insightful way in which we might ultimately be able to ‘translate the subject’,
French or otherwise.
15. See Jacques Derrida, ‘Des Tours de babel’, trans. Joseph F. graham, in Peggy kamuf (ed.),
A Derrida reader : between the blinds (hemel hempstead: harverster, 1991).
16. Jacques Derrida, Voyous (Paris: galilée, 2003), p. 126.
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